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This paper sheds new light on the assessment of firm networks via multiple directorships 
in terms of corporate firm performance. Using a large sample of European listed firms in the 
period from 2003 to 2011 and system GMM we find a significant compensation effect on 
corporate firm performance for the initial negative effect of horizontal multiple directorships by 
product market competition. In markets with effective competition, horizontal multiple 
directorships turn out to be an efficient mechanism to increase firm performance and thus assure 
competitive advantages. By contrast, linkages between up- and downstream firms have no 
significant influence on financial performance, irrespective of the level of competition intensity. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper contributes to an intense debate over the causes and effects of director firm 
linkages held by the public1, European political decision-makers2 and academic research. When 
discussing the relationship between multiple directorships and corporate profitability the role of 
product market competition has been neglected in most cases so far. Our study contributes to 
filling this gap by analyzing the interaction effects of horizontal and vertical inter-firm networks 
via multiple directorships and product market competition on corporate firm performance. 
Using balanced panel data of interlocking directorships between more than 800 firms in 17 
Western European countries from 2003-2011 and by specifying a dynamic approach we 
estimate a significantly positive impact of horizontal firm linkages through common 
directorships on corporate performance with higher levels of product market competition. 
Conversely, if competition intensity is comparatively low, we estimate the impact to be 
negative. With respect to vertical linkages and the total number of linkages we find no 
significant effects on corporate performance irrespective of the level of product market 
competition.  
Based on these findings, several conclusions can be drawn. First, although inter-firm 
connections hamper firm performance, product market competition subsequently compensates 
for this negative effect. Market pressure, therefore, impacts firm networks and the need to gain 
(information) advantages over competitors through multiple directorships. Second, only 
horizontal linkages play a significant role in corporate performance implying that information 
gained by multiple directorships is more valuable when the information concerns the same 
                                                 
1
 A recent prominent business cases was the appointment of Google’s CEO Eric Schmidt to Apple‘s 
board of directors. Following the announcement Eric Schmidt was supposed to contribute to Apple’s 
innovativeness by providing his industry-specific insights and experience. Three years later, Eric Schmidt 
resigned from Apple. In the press release, Apple explained that increasing rivalry between both firms in 
the market for operating systems intensified potential conflicts of interest. See 
http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2006/08/29Google-CEO-Dr-Eric-Schmidt-Joins-Apples-Board-of-
Directors.html. 
2
 E.g. European Commission (2011). 
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market as opposed to information concerning other markets.3 Therefore, it may be possible that 
multiple directorships functions similarly to tacit collusion. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the literature 
review and summarizes the aims of the study. Section 3 describes the data sample and the 
empirical method. Section 4 discusses the results, and Section 5 concludes the paper. 
2. Literature Review  
International organizational networks via equity investments and interlocking directorates 
have received an increasing amount of attention in the field of economic research and social 
science. Despite substantial efforts to track and illustrate inter-firm relations, previous studies 
are often limited to the description of the structure and development of networks, whereas the 
empirical economic effects following the establishment of respective connections have not been 
sufficiently and systematically evaluated from a European transnational perspective. A number 
of theoretical approaches are suitable to describe and explain the motives and effects of firms 
with common directors (e. g. Mizruchi 1996, Adams et al. 2010). 
From an institutional perspective, interlocking directorates might be a beneficial strategic 
instrument to facilitate coordination between legally independent organizations along the supply 
chain. Resource dependence theory suggests that dependencies may arise within the same 
industry or in vertical customer-supplier relations of up- and downstream firms (Pfeffer 1992). 
Similarly, building on transaction cost theory personal connections could be interpreted as an 
efficient mechanism for the exchange of goods and services (Williamson 1979). Closely linked 
to the latter, director linkages within the same industry allow firms to share internal or industry-
specific information or to coordinate strategic decision-making, such as decisions regarding 
investments in new products or technologies (e. g. Grant and Baden-Fuller 2004).  
Focusing on an individual perspective, researchers are interested in the specific individual 
                                                 
3
 It is also implied that the information process is supposed to be quicker when information is relevant for 
the same market compared to other (vertical) markets. 
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characteristics of outside directors with multiple mandates. From a knowledge based view, 
firms might acquire scarce and valuable knowledge and experiences through the co-optation of 
outside directors. This collaboration then improves the competences of the entire board (Grant 
1996a, Kor 2003, Grant and Baden-Fuller 2004). Relevant factors can include industry-specific 
knowledge or experiences regarding new technologies, competition or regulation issues. This 
view is supported by a number of empirical studies that focus on the role of outside directors in 
terms of advising competences (e.g., Coles et al. 2012, Connelly et al. 2010, Kor and 
Sundaramurthy 2009, Linck et al. 2008, Adams and Ferreira 2007, Carpenter and Westphal 
2001). Other papers have analyzed the role of outside directors for board monitoring in the field 
of corporate governance. Agency-theory states that outside directors are more independent and 
skilled and, therefore, increase the monitoring intensity in the boardroom (e.g., Ferris et al. 
2003, Hermalin and Weisbach 1998, Fama and Jensen 1983, Fama 1980). 
In addition to these anticipated positive arguments, director-linked firms might also 
weaken the monitoring process and, in turn, negatively influence firms’ outcomes. This is the 
case if directors with multiple board positions face conflicts of interest. For instance, the 
directors might have incentives to accept a rather high number of parallel board mandates 
(Conyon and Read 2006, Fich and Shivdasani 2006, Perry and Peyer 2005) to maximize self 
interest (Fahlenbrach et al. 2010). Further, conflicts of interest can occur between sending and 
receiving firms (e.g., Dittmann et al. 2010 in the case of representatives from financial firms). 
Additionally, Aghion et al. (2013) argue that firm-outsiders face a lack of information on 
internal processes, which mitigates their ability to adequately monitor executives (similar 
Balsmeier et al. 2014). Firm networks via multiple directorships may also indicate strong and 
close social ties among the management elite rather than a targeted development of structural 
links between firms (Kang and Kroll 2013, Hillman et al. 2010, Hwang and Kim 2009, 
Mizruchi 1996, Useem 1984). 
Previous empirical evidence on the relationship between multiple directorships and firm 
performance reveals mixed results. For instance, Field et al. (2013) concentrate on the advising 
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role of directors and document positive effects of a majority of board members with multiple 
directorships on firm value in the case of IPO firms. Fich and Shivdasani (2006) find a negative 
influence of “busy boards” on firm performance. Pathan and Faff (2013) detect that both board 
size and independent directors decrease the performance of banks. Conversely, Fahlenbrach et 
al. (2010) find no significant effect of CEOs on the operating performance of the appointing 
firm. 
When coordination via firm networks is examined, the respective economic activities of 
the linked firms seem to be of high academic interest. Vertical linkages may reduce risk and 
uncertainties along the supply chain while improving the flow of information. In a 
comprehensive study, Dass et al. (2014) identify outside directors from US firms in up- and 
downstream industries and find a positive impact on firm value and performance. Coles et al. 
(2008) report that the presence and value of outside directors on the board is higher in complex 
firms with a higher number of business segments. Second, inter-firm relationships, particularly 
on a horizontal level, are also subject to work in the field of competition economics and law. 
Firms might be able to exploit networks via multiple directorships to their own advantage and 
therefore harm competition if the relationship is used for collusive behavior. This includes an 
informal coordination of strategy, such as changing marketing policies or prices (Gabrielsen et 
al. 2011, Moaevero Milanesi and Winterstein 2002, Motta 2009). A recent study of Buch-
Hansen (2014) disclosed identified cartel cases and simultaneous interlocking directorates. 
Recent descriptive findings suggest that firms with horizontal and vertical director linkages are 
both associated with higher market power, as measured by the Lerner index, than unlinked 
firms. Conversely, the relationship is stronger in the case of intra-industry connections 
(Buchwald 2014, Monopolies Commission 2014). 
Recent work has also addressed the relevance of competition for the relationship between 
corporate governance characteristics and firm performance. Giroud and Mueller (2011) find that 
firms with weak governance, as measured by various antitakeover and shareholder rights 
provisions,  face lower performance and firm value if competition in the industry is weak. 
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Similarly, the introduction of business combination laws that weaken corporate governance by 
reducing the risk of hostile takeovers are associated with a decline in performance for firms 
operating in industries with low competition (Giroud and Mueller 2010). Ammann et al. (2011) 
provide supplementary evidence for a substitutive relationship between competition and 
corporate governance by showing that good governance mechanisms positively affect firm 
value solely in non-competitive markets. The previous findings suggest that indicators of 
corporate governance and the strength of competition are substitutes, indicating that competition 
limits the scope for opportunistic behavior and therefore aligns the interests of management and 
shareholders (Karuna 2007, Schmidt 1997). Further, empirical evidence reveals a selection of 
better qualified managers in competitive industries (van Reenen 2011).  
With reference to the current state of research the next logical step is to analyze whether 
firm networks reflected by multiple directorships are beneficial for the connected firms under 
the consideration of product market competition. More concretely, if firm networks via multiple 
directorships are an indication for weak governance, due to conflicts of interest and other 
reasons, increasing competition intensity should compensate for the negative effect of firm 
linkages. Alternatively, if multiple directorships are a crucial and efficient mechanism to share 
knowledge and experiences, external advice and monitoring are supposed to be more valuable 
in competitive industries. As a consequence, firms might particularly benefit from connections 
to other firms in environments with strong competition. Providing evidence for this issue is the 
point of this study. 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1. Data  
For the present empirical study, we use a comprehensive dataset from the (Monopolies 
Commission 2014) including nearly all publicly listed firms in 17 European member states 
including Norway and Switzerland for the period from 2003 to 2011. Financial data, ownership 
information and industry classifications were obtained from Bureau van Dijk’s “ORBIS” 
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database and merged with the “Officers & Directors” database of Thomson Reuters which 
includes detailed information on board members over time.4 Within the framework of the 
analysis we dropped (a) subsidiaries of controlling ultimate owners and (b) firms operating in 
the financial sector. Additionally, the empirical analyses are based on a balanced panel of those 
firms which are observed in all nine years under consideration. This procedure leaves us with a 
total number of 833 European firms with 7,497 firm-year observations. Table I displays the 
summary statistics for the relevant variables. The specification and sources of the variables are 
described in Table A1 and all the pairwise correlation coefficients between the variables are 
displayed in Table A2 in the appendix.  
Table I Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
ROA 7,497 3.02 3.26 8.09 -62.99 38.38 
ROCE 7,497 4.23 4.82 12.78 -113.76 55.28 
Tobin's Q 6,857 1.25 1.09 0.74 0.07 10.47 
Competition 7,497 0.97 0.97 0.02 0.65 1.00 
No. Links 7,497 3.42 2 3.64 0 22 
Horizontal Links 7,497 0.44 0 0.87 0 7 
Vertical Links 7,497 2.98 2 3.28 0 21 
Board Size 7,497 13.62 12 6.98 2 45 
Block 7,497 0.30 0 - 0 1 
Firm Age 7,497 54 35 50 1 493 
Employees 7,497 15,476.52 1,504.00 46,859.75 2 639,904 
Debt Equity Ratio 7,497 1.67 1.32 1.40 0.07 15.55 
Source: Based on data described in section 3. 
 
As dependent variables, we use return on assets (ROA) and return on capital employed 
(ROCE) as accounting-based indicators for financial performance, and alternatively use Tobin’s 
Q as a market-based performance measure. In addition, we include a set of firm-specific 
explanatory variables in our empirical models: Board Size represents the total number of 
executive and non-executive members on the boards of directors. To account for ownership 
concentration, a dummy variable (Block) is used which takes a value of one if at least one 
                                                 
4
 Figure A1 in the appendix illustrates the complex thicket of connected firms via multiple directorships 
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investor holds 25 percent or a more of a firm’s equity. Firm Age represents the number of years 
since the firm’s founding, and firm size is expressed in the number of Employees. The 
proportion of liabilities and shareholders' equity (Debt Equity Ratio) is used as a proxy for firm 
leverage. 
To measure the degree of director linkages on the firm-level, representing the main 
variable of interest, we use the total number of contacts to other firms within the sample (No. 
Links). In contrast to the majority of previous studies, which are limited to particular national 
economies, the current analysis is based on a cross-country design to account for the further 
development of a European internal market and the associated formation of transnational 
director firm linkages (Buchwald 2014, Heemskerk 2013). However, it is important to consider 
the still persistent technical differences in the composition of boards of directors and their role 
and characteristics in different institutional systems, particularly when contrasting the practices 
in so-called "liberal market economies" and "coordinated market economies” (e.g., Munari et al. 
2010, Kogut 2012). For instance, institutional and legal differences between monistic boards in 
Anglo-Saxon countries and dualistic or mixed board structures inter alia in Germany, Norway 
or France (Heidrick & Struggles 2011), tend to influence both the supervising and advising 
intensity between executive and non-executive directors. It is argued, on the one hand, that 
information asymmetries seem to be lower in monistic boards emphasizing the cooperation 
between executive and non-executive directors. As a consequence, executives and the CEO in 
particular gain a relatively prominent position in the boardroom (Adams et al. 2005). On the 
other hand, two-tiered board systems place emphasis on the monitoring function of the 
supervisory boards. Although non-executive directors seem to be more independent in dualistic 
systems, there might be higher demand for external information and knowledge provided by 
outside directors on two-tiered boards (Balsmeier et al. 2014). Figure 1 illustrates different 
possible constellations of multiple directorships between one- and two-tiered board systems. In 
the current study, we focus on multiple directorships as a channel for the flow and exchange of 
                                                                                                                                               
for the year 2011. 
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information between legally independent firms within and between industries. Therefore, we do 
not consider the possible direction of a link and refrain from distinguishing between sending 
and receiving firms (Fahlenbrach et al. 2010).  
Figure 1: Outside Directors on Monistic and Dualistic Boards 
Source: Own illustration. 
Table I also shows the established number of connections within the same industry 
(Horizontal Links) and Vertical Links representing the total number of linkages to up- or 
downstream firms. When calculating horizontal and vertical linkages we account for the main 
business and all ancillary segments. The figures reveal that multiple directorships are more 
common between firms of different economic activities. On average, the sample firms are 
vertically connected to nearly three firms compared to 0.5 firms in the same industry.  
Information on product market competition intensity on the industry level was obtained 
from the German Monopolies Commission (2014). Competition (comp) is calculated using 
individual Lerner indices of more than 700,000 firms on the two-digit NACE Rev. 2 industry 
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level in a certain country and year (Nickell 1996). Following Lerner (1934), the Lerner Index 
can be interpreted as a price-cost margin and indicates a firm’s ability to realize earnings above 
its marginal costs. Compared to alternative measures of business concentration in a certain 
market, the Lerner index has several advantages (Aghion et al. 2005). The competition value 
can range between 0 and 1, with a value of 1 indicating perfect competition. The summary 
statistics in Table I reveal that average competition amounts to 0.97 and ranges from 0.65 to 1. 
Table A3 provides further information about the distribution of the sample firms across 66 two-
digit industry-levels and reports the average pooled value of product market competition for 
each industry.  
3.2. Econometrics  
According to Wintoki et al. (2012) we assume a dynamic linear data generating process 
of a corporate firm’s performance, depending on contemporary determinants as, such as the 
variables of interests, firm linkages and market competition, among others, and an 
autoregressive term that captures market imperfections affecting typical firms’ corporate 
outcomes, such as those arising from, i. e., weak rational expectations of market agents and 
gradual learning (Muth 1961, Lovell 1986, Bebchuk et al. 2013). Through this assumption, we 
apply the so-called system GMM estimator (Arellano and Bover 1995 and Blundell and Bond 
1998) throughout the paper. This method is potentially able to ensure consistent and efficient 
estimations using instrumental variable techniques in a fixed-effects context even if relevant 
explanatory variables are missing (avoiding omitted variable bias)5 or are wrongly measured 
(avoiding errors in variables)6 and if interdependent relationships between the respective 
performance measure and the explanatory variables are present (avoiding simultaneous equation 
bias). The consistency of the system GMM estimator essentially depends on the validity of 
instrumental variables that can be tested for7 including on the validity of the so-called initial 
                                                 
5
 E.g. Hansen and Wernerfelt (1989). 
6
 Griliches and Hausman (1986) point out that the bias resulting from errors in variables may be 
magnified when using panel data estimators. 
7
 As far as the idiosyncratic error is not serially correlated and no overfitting bias is present, the problem 
of weak instruments, as discussed in e. g., Angrist and Krueger (2001) and Imbens (2014), is not of any 
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condition.8 Instrumental variables are basically generated by the system GMM from the sample 
itself which consist of lags in levels and differences of the dependent and explanatory 
variables.9 To lay the foundation of consistent estimations we choose the most careful model 
specification where almost all explanatory variables, particularly the variables of interest, are 
specified as endogenous and, thereore, have to be replaced by lags representing instrumental 
variables. In contrast, time dummies that are supposed to capture structural breaks are specified 
as strictly exogenous, and the variables Firm Age, Board, and Block are specified as 
predetermined. Regarding the data sample comprising firms from various industries, the 
inclusion of fixed-effects is necessary to control for time-invariant unobserved firm 
heterogeneity. To produce efficient results, the system GMM fully exploits information from 
the data sample because it estimates a system of equations in both first differences and levels so 
that no second wave must be dropped, which is the case in the so-called First Difference GMM 
method of Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988) and Arellano and Bond (1991).10 We use balanced panel 
data because sample attrition is detected to be random (Wooldridge 2002). We also control for 
heteroskedasticity and for downward bias in standard errors in finite samples by using the two-
step procedure correction method for the variance-covariance matrix subject to Windmeijer 
(2005).  
  
                                                                                                                                               
importance. See below the Arellano-Bond-Test and the Hansen-Test. 
8
 The initial condition is ∆,
 = 0	∀	 = 1,… ,  according to our model stated in equation 1. It is 
implied that deviations from long-run means must not be correlated with the fixed effects in the initial 
period, or in other words, deviations of the initial conditions from   +, λ have to be 
uncorrelated with the level of   + , λ where ,  represents the transposed matrix containing 
deterministic explanatory variables and		λ		represents the corresponding coefficient vector, see Blundell 
and Bond (1998). For a non-technical explanation see Roodman (2009). 
9
 According to the system GMM method, instrumental variables – lagged variables – are transformed in 
to differences to make them orthogonal respectively exogenous to the fixed effects, which would 
otherwise lead to the so-called Nickell bias of dynamic panel fixed effects estimations (Nickell 1981).  
10
 Recent simulation studies confirm the usefulness of the system GMM when its fundamental 
assumptions of valid instruments and no serial correlation of the idiosyncratic error apply (Flannery and 
Hankins 2013, Dang et al. 2015). A further promising method is X-Differencing newly developed by Han 
et al. 2014).  
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For instance, the final linear panel data model for firm i at time t as shown in Table II, 
column (f), is as follows: 
, =  + , +  , ! + "#$%&, + 
'()*+,, +-.)*+,, + /()*+,, ∗ #$%&, + 1.)*+,, ∗ #$%&, + 
2 +  + 3,			 
	∀	 = 1,… , ∧ 5 = 2,… , 7 ∧ ∆,
 = 0 ∧  = 3,	 = 0 ∧ 3,~. . 2. :0; <=
>,				(1) 
where , , ",	', -, /, 1 represent scalars of parameters and ! displays a vector of parameters 
associated with the transposed matrix of variables  ?,@  containing further explanatory variables 
as well as , 2 and 3,, denoting fixed-effects, time effects and idiosyncratic errors to be 
estimated, respectively. 
4. Results 
Table II displays the results from various model specifications where industry-adjusted 
ROA is the dependent variable. Specifications of the models (b), (d) and (f) are identical to the 
models (a), (c) and (e), respectively, up to the autoregressive term included, so that the former 
represent dynamic approaches and the latter represents static approaches. Additionally, model 
specification is getting consecutively relaxed from the basic specification in (a) and (b) until the 
final specification in (e) and (f).11 Before starting with the results’ discussion, we have to check 
for the estimations’ validity. First, according to various panel unit root tests in Table A4, the 
selection of variables are stationary processes so that standard errors including test statistics are 
not biased.12 Second, to ensure consistency of the system GMM (and of other GMM estimator), 
instrumental variables have to be valid from a statistical perspective, meaning that residuals are 
not serially correlated and no over-fitting is present. As the Arellano-Bond tests show, at least 
for the dynamic approaches, the first-differenced residuals are first-order but not second-order 
                                                 
11
 Note that in equilibrium, shocks are absent and the following relationship holds , = ,, so 
that dynamic approaches become static approaches. Equation 1 can then be rewritten as follows including 
new parameters	A	and	E etc.: , = F + A
GH,IJ
 + E
KLMNH,I
 +⋯	∀	, 5. 
12
 Stationarity implies convergence to equilibrium in the long run from a theoretical perspective. 
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serially correlated, which is supposed to be the case when the idiosyncratic error is white noise 
as assumed. The results simultaneously reveal the need for including an autoregressive term. 
Therefore, evidence is presented for an important requirement regarding the validity of moment 
conditions. According to the Hansen test, the null hypothesis of non-overidentification cannot 
be rejected and, thus, the instrumental variables are valid. That test result completes our validity 
check for the estimation method chosen.   
Based on these tests, in the following, we concentrate on dynamic approaches, in 
particular on model (f), reflecting the most flexible type of model specification. In so doing, we 
estimate a negative impact of competition on firm performance, as expected. Firm performance 
is also negatively related to firm size, measured by the number of employees, and to firm debt, 
measured by the debt equity ratio.  
Focusing on the variables of interests, horizontal and vertical firm linkages, exclusively 
horizontal firm linkages significantly decrease a firm’s corporate performance, as depicted by 
the coefficient ', whereas the marginal effect of vertical ties, depicted by the coefficient -, 
remains insignificant. This finding points to a negative assessment of multiple directorships 
within the same industry and could be explained by the fact that directors with multiple 
directorships might face various conflicts of interests. These conflicts could stem from 
potentially opportunistic behavior at the cost of shareholders (e.g., Fich and Shivdasani 2006 or 
Conyon and Read 2006). The negative coefficient is also in line with the explanation that 
outsiders face a lack of firm-specific knowledge, mitigating their ability to adequately 
contribute to corporate decision making (Grant 1996a, 1996b). Finally, this result could also 
point to conflicts of interest between the objectives of the linked firms. As a result, horizontal 
connections mitigate on average firm performance. 
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Table II: The Influence of Director Firm Linkages on Corporate Firm Performance 
 
Model 
  (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) 
 ROA ROA ROA ROA ROA ROA 
ROA (t-1) 
 
0.259*** 
 
0.250*** 
 
0.238*** 
  
(8.21) 
 
(7.87) 
 
(7.83) 
Competition -60.377*** -43.699** -71.521*** -62.013** -63.463*** -60.034** 
 
(-2.85) (-2.16) (-2.78) (-2.49) (-2.68) (-2.44) 
No. Links 
  
-3.647 -1.772 
  
   
(-1.23) (-0.59) 
  
No. Links x Competition 
  
3.776 1.796 
  
   
(1.23) (0.59) 
  
Horizontal Links 
    
-12.855* -14.569** 
     
(-1.76) (-2.06) 
Vertical Links 
    
-1.078 0.146 
     
(-0.35) (0.04) 
Horizontal Links x Competition 
    
12.978* 14.768** 
     
(1.73) (2.03) 
Vertical Links x Competition 
    
1.196 -0.139 
     
(0.38) (-0.04) 
Board Size 0.008 -0.006 -0.021 -0.033 -0.008 -0.052 
 
(0.08) (-0.06) (-0.20) (-0.35) (-0.08) (-0.55) 
Block -0.482 -1.014* -0.460 -0.881 -0.304 -0.709 
 
(-0.81) (-1.80) (-0.76) (-1.54) (-0.49) (-1.29) 
Log Firm Age 0.130 0.207 -0.572 -0.343 -0.528 0.022 
 
(0.11) (0.18) (-0.48) (-0.32) (-0.44) (0.02) 
Log Employees -2.726** -4.836*** -1.493 -3.568*** -1.694* -4.008*** 
 
(-2.30) (-3.99) (-1.43) (-3.06) (-1.68) (-3.34) 
Debt Equity Ratio -1.321*** -0.411 -1.487*** -0.589** -1.420*** -0.601** 
 
(-3.83) (-1.35) (-4.76) (-2.08) (-4.56) (-2.10) 
Constant 83.437*** 80.983*** 88.239*** 91.975*** 81.310*** 92.463*** 
  (3.57) (3.78) (3.27) (3.59) (3.36) (3.70) 
N 7,497 6,664 7,497 6,664 7,497 6,664 
Groups 833 833 833 833 833 833 
Instruments 183 208 239 264 295 320 
Fixed effects and Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-Test (F-Statistic) 5.50*** 15.87*** 4.58*** 13.98*** 4.68*** 14.53*** 
Arellano-Bond-Test - AR(1)  
(p − value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Arellano-Bond-Test - AR(2)  
(p − value) 0.002 0.826 0.002 0.763 0.002 0.694 
Hansen-Test (p − value) 0.293 0.146 0.231 0.199 0.329 0.332 
Sargan-Test (p − value) 0.000 0.001 0.978 0.000 0.998 0.055 
Diff-in-Hansen-Test (p − value) 0.274 0.114 0.177 0.152 0.314 0.274 
Notes: T-Statistics are in parentheses. The asterisks ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%  
level, respectively. AR(1) and AR(2) are tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation in the first-
differenced residuals, under the null of no serial correlation. The Hansen test of over-identification is under the 
null that all instruments are valid. The Diff-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity is under the null that instruments used 
for the equations in levels are exogenous.  
Source: Own calculations according to section 3.2. 
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To test the hypothesis that competition compensates for the negative effect of horizontal 
multiple directorships, we also include two interaction terms consisting of horizontal and 
vertical linkages on the one side and competition on the other side. The coefficient is significant 
only in the case of horizontal firm linkages. We therefore calculate the total marginal effect of 
horizontal firm linkages, HLinks, simply as follows: 
VWXYH,I
VZ[\]^H,I_ `	∙	b = 	' + / ∗ #$%&,,     (2) 
where the sign depends on the level of product market competition, comp. In other words, 
according to our suggested approach, to analyze the effect of firm linkages on corporate 
performance measures, the level of market competition has to be considered as well. Because 
the coefficient of the interaction,	/, term is significantly positive the marginal effect of 
horizontal links, HLinks, is negative if the level of market competition is lower than 0.987 and 
becomes positive if it is approximately greater than or equal to 0.987. The positive interaction 
clearly illustrates that market competition compensates for the negative effect of horizontal 
director firm linkages associated with weak governance. If competition increases, the negative 
effect declines. Higher market pressure, such as the threat of hostile takeover (Schmidt 1997, 
Shleifer and Vishny 1997), disciplines management and an appropriate assignment of mandates 
appears to be particularly important. In situations of fierce competition, horizontal multiple 
directors positively contribute to firm performance. This finding suggests a positive selection of 
better skilled managers in competitive environments.   
If the intensity of competition and firm linkages within the same market increases 
simultaneously, the effect on corporate firm performance equals the coefficient of the 
interaction term: 
 
VcWXYH,I
VZ[\]^H,I	VKLMNH,I_ `	∙	b = 	/ = 14.768 > 0.   (3) 
As a further robustness check, we initially estimate extensions of model (f) in Table II by 
dropping insignificant explanatory variables and, therefore, present more efficient 
specifications. The results displayed in Table A5 are quite similar to those in Table II, 
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confirming previous findings. In addition, we apply model specification (e) and (f) in Table II to 
alternative measures of both accounting and market performance. Table A6 exemplarily shows 
the result for return on capital employed (ROCE) and Tobin’s Q. Although both estimations for 
ROCE revealed comparable results to those in Table II, estimations regarding Tobin’s Q are not 
robust subject to the Hansen test.  
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, we shed new light on the assessment of firm networks in terms of corporate 
firm performance. This paper is the first to analyze the interaction of horizontal and vertical 
firm linkages via multiple directorships and product market competition on financial corporate 
measures. Using a large sample of European listed firms in the period 2003 to 2011 and the 
system GMM we find a significant compensation effect on corporate firms’ performances for 
the initial negative effect of horizontal multiple directorships by product market competition. 
This finding highlights the moderating effect of product market competition: in industries with 
relative high competition, connections via multiple directorships seem to be a beneficial 
mechanism to gain competitive advantages. The interaction term of vertical linkages and 
competition has indeed no significant effect on firm performance. 
From a firm’s perspective, our results indicate that shareholders should carefully evaluate 
appointment decisions with respect to recent public recommendations for board diversity. 
Further, our results suggest that external factors such as market competition have to be 
considered when assessing the costs and benefits of multiple directorships. 
Our findings are also relevant for political decision-makers in the field of competition 
policy. In general, horizontal linkages may be a mechanism to facilitate collaboration between 
competitors or, in particular with simultaneous financial interests, to exert influence on a firm’s 
strategy or behavior. Thus, horizontal connections are potentially suitable to harm competition. 
However, our analyses reveal that the respective inter-firm connections are exclusively 
beneficial in situations of fierce competition.  
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The empirical results provide several reference points for future research. Efforts should 
be put into qualifying the type of director linkages, in particular in terms of the possible 
direction of the connections. The effect of respective linkages differs depending on the view of 
sending or receiving firms. Aditionally, the specific vertical linkages could be analyzed in more 
detail to be able to consider connections between up- and downstream firms. Moreover, with 
more detailed data at hand individual characteristics of multiple directors, such as specific 
qualifications following academic education or previous professional experience, could be 
considered in future, deeper analyses.  
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Appendix 
Table A1: Variable Specification 
 
Variable Description Source 
Firm Characteristics    
ROA Industry-adjusted return on assets , calculated as the difference between a 
firm’s ROA and the mean 2-digit industry ROA (NACE Rev. 2) 
Bureau van Dijk 
Return on Capital 
Employed 
Industry-adjusted return on capital employed , calculated as the difference 
between a firm’s ROCE and the mean 2-digit industry ROCE (NACE Rev. 2) 
Bureau van Dijk 
Tobin’s Q Industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q, calculated as the difference between a firm’s 
Tobin’s Q and the mean 2-digit industry Tobin’s Q (NACE Rev. 2) 
Bureau van Dijk 
Competition Competition measure on the 2-digit industry-level (NACE Rev. 2), following 
(Aghion et al. 2005) 
Bureau van Dijk 
No. Links Number of connections to other firms via interlocking directorates ThomsonReuters 
Horizontal Links Number of connections to firms in the same industry ThomsonReuters 
Vertical Links Number of connections to up- and downstream firms ThomsonReuters 
Board Size Number of executive and non-executive directors on the board ThomsonReuters 
Block Dummy variable that equals 1 if the largest shareholder owns at least 25 % of 
the capital stock  
Bureau van Dijk 
Firm Age Firm age in years Bureau van Dijk 
Debt Equity Ratio (Total Assets - Shareholders Funds) / Shareholders Funds Bureau van Dijk 
Employees Number of employees Bureau van Dijk 
Debt Equity Ratio (Total Assets - Shareholders Funds) / Shareholders Funds Bureau van Dijk 
Source: See column Source.  
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Table A2: Correlation Matrix 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
(1) ROA 1.00 
           
(2) ROCE 0.93*** 1.00 
          
(3) Tobin's Q 0.30*** 0.25*** 1.00 
         
(4) Competition -0.19*** -0.16*** -0.22*** 1.00 
        
(5) No. Links 0.07*** 0.08*** 0.04*** -0.04*** 1.00 
       
(6) Horizontal Links 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.03*** -0.07*** 0.52*** 1.00 
      
(7) Vertical Links 0.06*** 0.08*** 0.03*** -0.03** 0.97*** 0.31*** 1.00 
     
(8) Board Size 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.05*** -0.05*** 0.54*** 0.28*** 0.53*** 1.00 
    
(9) Block -0.01 -0.01 -0.03** -0.05*** -0.12*** -0.08*** -0.11*** 0.02 1.00 
   
(10) Firm Age 0.04*** 0.03*** -0.04*** 0.04*** 0.17*** 0.09*** 0.17*** 0.19*** 0.04*** 1.00 
  
(11) Employees 0.03** 0.04*** 0.00 0.00 0.46*** 0.24*** 0.45*** 0.37*** -0.07*** 0.12*** 1.00 
 
(12) Debt Equity Ratio -0.19*** -0.08*** -0.08*** 0.11*** 0.17*** 0.06*** 0.18*** 0.16*** 0.03** 0.06*** 0.21*** 1.00 
Notes: The asterisks ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%  level, respectively.  
Source: Based on data described in section 3.  
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Table A3: Distribution on the Industry-Level 
 
2-digit 
Code 
Description No. Observa-
tions 
Competition 
(pooled) 
01 Crop and animal production, hunting and related service activities   27 0.961 
05 Mining of coal and lignite   36 0.987 
06 Extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas   63 0.935 
07 Mining of metal ores   63 0.916 
08 Other mining and quarrying   27 0.970 
09 Mining support service activities   54 0.931 
10 Manufacture of food products   252 0.985 
11 Manufacture of beverages   90 0.984 
12 Manufacture of tobacco products   9 0.942 
13 Manufacture of textiles   45 0.963 
14 Manufacture of wearing apparel   81 0.971 
15 Manufacture of leather and related products   9 0.961 
16 Manufacture of wood and of products of wood and cork, except 
furniture   
18 0.980 
17 Manufacture of paper and paper products   207 0.986 
18 Printing and reproduction of recorded media   90 0.978 
19 Manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products   9 0.970 
20 Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products   252 0.967 
21 Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products and pharmaceutical 
preparations   
153 0.939 
22 Manufacture of rubber and plastic products   135 0.975 
23 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products   135 0.970 
24 Manufacture of basic metals   207 0.976 
25 Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery and 
equipment   
189 0.963 
26 Manufacture of computer, electronic and optical products   792 0.957 
27 Manufacture of electrical equipment   117 0.960 
28 Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c.   468 0.962 
29 Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers   126 0.980 
30 Manufacture of other transport equipment   135 0.972 
31 Manufacture of furniture   54 0.971 
32 Other manufacturing   189 0.941 
33 Repair and installation of machinery and equipment   9 0.968 
35 Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply   90 0.972 
36 Water collection, treatment and supply   18 0.991 
37 Sewerage   9 0.966 
38 Waste collection, treatment and disposal activities; materials recovery 
  
9 0.966 
39 Remediation activities and other waste management services   9 0.964 
41 Construction of buildings   243 0.967 
42 Civil engineering   63 0.972 
43 Specialised construction activities   27 0.972 
45 Wholesale and retail trade and repair of motor vehicles and 
motorcycles   
63 0.992 
46 Wholesale trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles   279 0.976 
47 Retail trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles   243 0.983 
49 Land transport and transport via pipelines   63 0.992 
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2-digit 
Code 
Description No. Observa-
tions 
Competition 
(pooled) 
50 Water transport   45 0.982 
51 Air transport   63 0.986 
52 Warehousing and support activities for transportation   135 0.983 
53 Postal and courier activities   9 0.985 
55 Accommodation   45 1.000 
56 Food and beverage service activities   45 0.980 
58 Publishing activities   351 0.954 
59 Motion picture, video and television programme production, sound 
recording and music publishing activities   
9 0.959 
60 Programming and broadcasting activities   36 0.952 
61 Telecommunications   216 0.972 
62 Computer programming, consultancy and related activities   441 0.958 
68 Real estate activities   333 0.985 
69 Legal and accounting activities   9 0.892 
70 Activities of head offices; management consultancy activities   90 0.974 
71 Architectural and engineering activities; technical testing and analysis  108 0.954 
72 Scientific research and development   18 0.982 
73 Advertising and market research   90 0.966 
74 Other professional, scientific and technical activities   72 0.964 
77 Rental and leasing activities   54 0.984 
78 Employment activities   63 0.972 
79 Travel agency, tour operator and other reservation service and related 
activities   
27 0.991 
80 Security and investigation activities   27 0.969 
81 Services to buildings and landscape activities   27 0.971 
82 Office administrative, office support and other business support 
activities   
27 0.970 
Total   7,497 0.968 
Notes: 2-digit codes according to the Statistical Classification of Economic Activities in the European 
Community, NACE Rev. 2 (2008).   
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Table A4: Panel Unit Root Tests 
 
 
ROA ROCE Comp HLinks 
Levin-Lin-Chu test1 -63.31*** -58.13*** -32.76*** -16.05*** 
Harris-Tzavalis test2 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.28*** 0.52*** 
Breitung test3 -15.98*** -16.15*** -11.21*** -6.46*** 
Im-Pesaran-Shin test4 -15.30*** -15.50*** / / 
Fisher-type test5 76.27*** 80.88*** 30.15*** -10.54*** 
Notes: 1(Levin et al. 2002), 2 (Harris and Tzavalis 1999), 3 (Breitung 2001), 4 (Im et al. 2003), 5 (Choi 
2001). All panel unit root tests presented test for non-stationarity under the null hypothesis. The asterisks 
***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%  level, respectively. 
Source: Own calculations based on data described in section 3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
27 
 
Table A5: Various Specifications 
 
Model 
 (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l) 
  ROA ROA ROA ROA ROCE ROCE 
ROA (t-1) 0.282*** 0.256*** 0.248*** - - - 
 
(10.23) (8.89) (8.01)    
ROCE (t-1) - - - - 0.271*** 0.291*** 
     (9.55) (10.12) 
Competition -57.66*** -94.39*** -58.35** -81.26*** -117.29*** -75.89** 
 
(-2.51) (-3.93) (-2.50) (-3.71) (-3.63) (-2.54) 
Horizontal Links -14.74*** -18.58*** -15.90** -22.37*** -27.62*** -23.97*** 
 
(-2.20) (-2.59) (-2.01) (-2.70) (-2.69) (-2.74) 
Vertical Links -1.98  -2.93 - - -1.57 -0.418 
 
(-0.72) (-0.79)   (-0.33) (-0.13) 
Horizontal Links x Competition 15.09** 18.99*** 16.13** 22.83*** 27.96*** 24.02*** 
 
(2.19) (2.57) (1.97) (2.66) (2.64) (2.66) 
Vertical Links x Competition 1.86 3.01 - - 1.54 0.112 
 
(0.66) (0.78)   (0.31) (0.03) 
Board Size - -0.145* - - -0.247* - 
 
 (-1.68)   (-1.80)  
Block - -0.582 - - -1.17 - 
 
 (-1.01)   (-1.15)  
Log Firm Age - 0.410 - - 0.0377 - 
 
 (0.42)   (0.03)  
Log Employees - -2.39** -3.95*** -2.14* -2.120 - 
 
 (-2.42) (-3.36) (-1.67) (-1.29)  
Debt Equity Ratio - -0.649** -0.398 -1.08*** -0.685 - 
 
 (-2.40) (-1.33) (-3.60) (-1.27)  
Constant 58.76*** 113.80*** 88.96*** 99.41*** 137.92*** 77.92*** 
  (2.64) (4.71) (3.56) (4.08) (4.18) (2.69) 
N 6,664 6,664 6,664 7,497 6,664 6,664 
Groups 833 833 833 833 833 833 
Instruments 176 313 176 148 313 176 
Fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Effects Yes No Yes Yes No Yes 
F-Test (F-Statistic) 13.24*** 20.38*** 16.81*** 6.01*** 18.05*** 14.24*** 
Arellano-Bond-Test - AR(1)  
(p − value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Arellano-Bond-Test - AR(2)  
(p − value) 0.968 0.848 0.768 0.003 0.278 0.246 
Hansen-Test (p − value) 0.069 0.082 0.043 0.126 0.095 0.093 
Sargan-Test (p − value) 0.003 0.030 0.000 0.383 0.203 0.054 
Diff-in-Hansen-Test 
 (p − value) 0.053 - 0.038 0.079 - 0.081 
Notes: T-Statistics are in parentheses. The asterisks ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%  
level, respectively. AR(1) and AR(2) are tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation in the first-
differenced residuals, under the null of no serial correlation. The Hansen test of over-identification is under the 
null that all instruments are valid. The Diff-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity is under the null that instruments used 
for the equations in levels are exogenous.   
Source: Own calculations according to section 3.2. 
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Table A6: Alternative Measures of Firm Performance 
 
  
Model 
  
(m) (n) (o) (p) 
 
ROCE ROCE Tobin’s Q Tobin’s Q 
ROCE (t-1) - 0.251*** - - 
(8.24) 
Tobin's Q (t-1) - - - 0.225*** 
(6.60) 
Competition -93.007*** -77.266** -3.160 -1.521 
(-2.80) (-2.36) (-1.54) (-0.94) 
Horizontal Links -25.266** -23.438** -1.004 -0.614 
(-2.32) (-2.20) (-0.96) (-0.54) 
Vertical Links 0.072 2.229 -0.587* -0.449* 
(0.02) (0.49) (-1.76) (-1.71) 
Horizontal Links x Competition 25.175** 23.575** 0.965 0.584 
(2.24) (2.15) (0.89) (0.50) 
Vertical Links x Competition -0.055 -2.311 0.606* 0.463* 
(-0.01) (-0.49) (1.76) (1.71) 
Board Size -0.138 -0.090 0.007 0.011 
(-0.80) (-0.62) (0.78) (1.31) 
Block -1.131 -1.279 -0.013 0.040 
(-1.06) (-1.36) (-0.27) (0.96) 
Log Firm Age -1.323 -0.413 -0.124 -0.387*** 
(-0.77) (-0.24) (-1.13) (-3.80) 
Log Employees -2.942* -4.989** -0.112 -0.114 
(-1.65) (-2.46) (-1.51) (-1.42) 
Debt Equity Ratio -1.950*** -0.753 0.009 -0.009 
(-4.21) (-1.26) (0.55) (-0.37) 
Constant 126.048*** 119.497*** 4.257** 3.555** 
  (3.67) (3.52) (2.04) (2.10) 
N 7,497 6,664 6,857 5,954 
Groups 833 833 826 821  
Instruments 295 320 295 320  
Fixed effects and Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes  
F-Test (F-Statistic) 5.46*** 13.23*** 11.91*** 16.76***  
Arellano-Bond-Test - AR(1)  
(p − value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
Arellano-Bond-Test - AR(2)  
(p − value) 0.078 0.356 0.000 0.193  
Hansen-Test (p − value) 0.703 0.322 0.000 0.000  
Sargan-Test (p − value) 1.000 0.323 0.000 0.000  
Diff-in-Hansen-Test (p − value) 0.665 0.256 0.000 0.000  
Notes: T-Statistics are in parentheses. The asterisks ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%  
level, respectively. AR(1) and AR(2) are tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation in the first-
differenced residuals, under the null of no serial correlation. The Hansen test of over-identification is under the 
null that all instruments are valid. The Diff-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity is under the null that instruments used 
for the equations in levels are exogenous.   
Source: Own calculations according to section 3.2  
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Figure A1: European network of interlocking directorates 
 
 
Notes: The grey spots on the edge of the ellipse represent the firms in the sample. The connecting black 
lines symbolize linkages between two firms via multiple directorships. Source: Own illustration. 
 
